Institutional factors are often among the most formidable obstacles to the development and implementation of feasible water resource programs. Guidelines for gathering and analyzing information on institutional factors as part of water resource planning and evaluation activities are presented. In approaching the analysis of current institutional arrangements, analysts should pay particular attention to (1) the actors and their stakes in the decision-making process; (2) the political and decisionmaking resources actors have available to pursue their interests; and (3) the biases of the alternative decision-making structures through which various water resource decisions are made. While institutional analysis can pinpoint important barriers and constraints to plan implementation, it is of most use when it goes beyond a description and analysis of current institutional arrangements to assess possible strategies and solutions that can be applied to the problems identified.
turns to the task of preparing institutional analyses and briefly outlines some issues that the analyst must consider before beginning to compile data and information for the analysis. It identifies the kinds of information that the analyst needs to collect about current institutional arrangements for water use and management. These categories include information on actors, the resources that they have available to pursue their interests, and the biases of the alternative decision-making structures through which various water resource decisions are made. The last section of the guide points out the importance of going beyond a description and analysis of current conditions to an assessment of the possible strategies and solutions that can be applied to the problems identified.
In order to apply to a variety of situations, the discussion must• of necessity, be general. An effort is made, however, to illustrate many points with specific examples. A number of institutional analyses were conducted in connection with proposed energy development projects requiring water, and several examples are drawn from these studies. Many of the examples are related to the Colorado River basin because of the authors' familiarity with western water development.
THE IMPORTANCE OF INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
The term "institutional" is meant to include those legal, political and administrative structures and processes through which decisions are made with respect to public policy. These structures and processes consist of laws and regulations that govern the distribution of benefits and costs and set the ground rules for conflict resolution. They include also the informal procedures by which conflicts are regularly resolved when laws are unclear or are not consistent with the actual distribution of influence in the policy network. Institutional arrangements rest upon the distribution of political support for a given allocation of costs and benefits and are affected by public opinion, the attitude and preferences of interest groups, and the orientation of public officials. The process by which analysts can improve their competence to recognize how institutional factors affect water resources planning and evaluation and can manage the opportunities and barriers presented by institutional factors is termed institutional analysis.
Institutional factors can often be among the most formidable influences upon water resources programs. Yet, despite such importance, one anomoly of water resources planning 323 mitigated. The guidelines that follow are intended to •:onvey in terms understandable to the non-social scientist the important institutional questions that should be addressed and the related data that should be collected.
THE CONTEXT OF ANALYSIS

Defining the Problem and $coping the Assessment
The perceptions of a present or emerging set of water problems that prompt the undertaking of an assessment orient and to some extent bound what the institutional analyst should consider. Perhaps the assessment may be initiated because of a perception of impending water shortage, an energy crisis requiring water intensive development, or a desire to protect instream water uses or water quality. In each case the nature of the issue will to a large extent determine the magnitude of change associated with various solutions to the problem, who the relevant actors are and how they perceive their interests, what resources the actors have available, and the arenas in which action may take place. It is imperative that the analyst clearly specify the context of the analysis in an explicit statement of the scope and purpose of the assessment. By clearly identifying the starting point and assumptions, the analyst can avoid cataloging the universe and including extraneous material. Unless the analysis is properly focused and framed, there is a danger of describing institutions without considering the extent to which they may be related to the question at issue.
A clear statement of the context of analysis also provides an opportunity at some point for the analyst to consider what might happen if the context should dramatically change, perhaps by the replacement of drought by flooding, the substitution of an energy shortage by an oil glut, a change in economic circumstances, a shift in partisan power, or the development of a social or political movement. While initially the analyst must take what now exists in the institutional landscape as given, it is important to portray the institutional context as dynamic and capable of change that would alter the scope of necessary institutional considerations. Institutional analysis needs to be iterative and continuous, expanding and contracting as changes in the institutional setting Occur.
Understanding the Limits of Analysis
It is also important for the analyst to realize that the process of institutional analysis is itself affected by institutional factors. What is or is not included in an assessment is in part a function of the institutional bias of the agency doing the assessment. It is also a function of institutional judgments as to the desirability of making explicit the institutional factors underlying physical estimates and projections.
The institutional analyst must not, for example, be so intimidated by the apparent conclusiveness of physical data as to overlook the institutional influences integrally involved in data collection and interp.retation. An analyst assessing the Colorado River basin, for instance, will be confronted with estimates of reconstructed virgin outflow ranging from 13.5 x 106 acre feet (tree ring data covering 400 year period) to 14.9 x 106 acre feet (stream gauge data sets for 1906-1973) [Weatherford and Jacoby, 1975] . Different interests promote different data sets and methodologies. High flow estimates, experience has shown, are used to support water resource development projects, while low flow estimates are used to oppose further development, support augmentation, or promote conservation.
Water supply figures are not the only data that must be approached cautiously. Projections of future water demand are notoriously speculative and unreliable, in part because they exhibit the tendency of water development agencies and interests to inflate the market demand for water to justify further investment in water projects. Such projections ought to be repeated with caution and presented with qualification, i.e., institutional sources and assumptions ought to be pointed out. For example, the rate and level of projected energy development for the upper Colorado River basin has not materialized [U.S. Department of Interior, 1974]; synfuel and power plant development has been slower and more modest than previously estimated by the missionoriented Bureau of Reclamation.
Effective institutional analysts will be sensitive to the institutional as well as the methodological limits on analysis [Cortner and $chweitzer, 1983; Fischhoff, 1977] . They will be able to relate the process of analysis to the institutional setting within which an assessment is developed and its results used.
Our discussion now turns to examine the kinds of questions to ask in assessing the actors, resources, and institu-tional structures involved in current institutional arrangements for water resources decision making.
ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INSTITUTIONS
Individual actors have certain rights or values which they seek to preserve or enhance. They pursue their interests by using the resources they have available within the bounds imposed by the sociopolitical system. When change either threatens to impact adversely or to advance their interests, actors have incentives to participate in the decision process. When mobilized, they then strive to ensure that any resulting decisions are made in the institutional arenas most conducive to their interests and their available resources.
In approaching the analysis of current institutional arrangements, the analyst should therefore pay particular attention to (1) actors and their stakes in decision making for water allocation and use; (2) the resources actors have at their disposal to use if sufficiently motivated to do so; and (3) the biases of the alternative decision-making arenas through which actors may try to achieve their goals.
Identifying Actors and Their Stakes
The analysis of group interests, resources, membership, and practices is a necessity in institutional assessment [Truman, 1955; Greenwald, 1977; Moe, 1980 ]. An important step toward identifying relevarit group interests or actors is made when the analyst specifies the scope and purpose of the assessment. When properly drawn, a statement of purpose and scope also indicates the stakes, or what gains or losses may be at issue. For instance, an assessment of water availability for energy in a fully allocated river basin naturally draws the analyst to consider the stakes of established users who currently exercise water rights. Water rights are generally acquired by the act of appropriating water, the possession of riparian or overlying land, or the grant (e.g., permit) or contractual promise of a government that has assumed ownership or control of the water, depending on the circumstances and water law system of the particular jurisdiction involved. Existing allocations of water rights are a reflection of accommodations to previous claimants for water use who, in turn, currently are challenged [Tarlock, 1982] .
The analyst must identify how and to what degree various uses or users will be affected by the water issues being assessed, i.e., reduced or increased quantity, degraded or improved quality, increased or decreased price, greater or lesser vulnerability to drought and other stress, deprivation or increase of opportunity to grow, changing lifestyles, etc. While economists exclude secondary impacts from their cost-benefit analyses for sound technical reasons, the incidence and magnitude of both primary and secondary impacts should be identified from an institutional perspective. For instance, the primary impact of allocating surplus water to energy in a basin dominated by irrigated agriculture may be small. Yet, secondarily, farmers may have to compete with energy developers for labor, capital, transportation facilities, and other goods and services. Assessing secondary socioeconomic impacts is essential to sorting out the stakes and actors involved in making water available to energy. The attention given to such matters as the socioeconomic impacts of energy development in a region, however, requires judgment because an assessment must not lose sight of the fact that its focus is water-related impacts and not necessarily energy development impacts. As the authors of an assessment discussing the availability of water for synfuel development in the upper Colorado River basin report, dramatic changes will occur in energy-impacted communities regardless of the source, quantity, or use of water [Colorado Department of Natural Resources, 1979] . Nevertheless, location of synfuel plants in given communities in given subbasins could have dramatic impacts on employment and the general character of life and should be addressed in such assessments [Cummings and Schulze, 1978] .
It is important that the analyst identify anticipated or perceived as well as scientifically predicted impacts. Water is a highly emotional and symbolic issue. One needs only to consider the public controversy that ensues whenever it is proposed to dam a river used for white water rafting or to transfer water from one region to another to recognize how volatile public feelings are on water issues. For some people the loss of Glen Canyon can never be counterbalanced regardless of the benefits of Lake Powell. Institutional analysts must invariably use judgment to distinguish between important and trivial impacts. Yet in making such determinations they must take into consideration the judgments of those impacted. Potential conflicts can be generated by those who perceive impacts as significant and are willing to take action to protect their interests.
The variability in perception of impacts is illustrated in the issue of water availability for energy. It is almost inevitable that there will be varying perceptions regarding the desirability of some aspects of any project of the dimensions of an emerging energy technology (EET) facility. The authors of the Upper Colorado River Basin Assessment, for example, explicitly recognize these sources of conflict at various points throughout their report and most pointedly in stating:
... one may anticipate that any further depletions of the streams of the Upper Colorado River Basin by EET development (or any other uses, for that matter) will be in conflict with the values and perceptions of at least some segment of the public under just about any circumstances...
[Colorado Department of Natural Resources, 1979] . Recognition of the potential for conflict equips the reader for an evaluation of the likelihood that there may be serious challenges focusing on water issues either to an overall basinwide plan or to a specific proposal to site plants in a given area.
The reading of contractual rights and obligations may reveal the stakes of parties to whom benefits and costs may accrue through changes being assessed. Twenty percent of the farming in the West, for example, occurs in federal reclamation projects. In these projects, rights to the delivery of stored and regulated water are defined in part by longterm contracts that provide the mechanism for the repayment, operation, and maintenance of project works. The master contracts between the Bureau of Reclamation and the water distribution districts--as well as the contracts and arrangements between the districts and the individual users-provide important sources of information concerning the identity and water entitlement of users. The identification of primary and secondary effects is a common requirement of environmental impact statements and the previously required principles and standards; therefore the methodology is well developed. Of course, what people feel, believe, and value is likely to be more difficult to specify than concrete physical and economic impacts. Yet the analyst usually can rely on secondary sources. Students of history and literature have dodumented the development and persistence of attitudes about water among groups in the population. These attitudes and values are often articulated by spokespersons in public hearings or in newspaper coverage. It is suggested that the institutional analyst become immersed in the particulars of the problem from the perspective of water users who have something at stake. The analyst should begin by learning all he or she can about the background, experience, and points of view of various interests. Early on, the analyst should begin to compile a list of key informants or contacts in the region or basin being assessed.
In identifying interests with a stake in water allocations, the analyst must pay particular attention to those that may not be readily apparent. Although often not included as interests at party to water decisions, the analyst must identify local, state, regional, and federal water and other resource agencies. While not benefiting or losing from water allocations themselves, these organizations have a stake in the distribution of authority and accompanying personnel and budget allocations [Rourke, 1969; Downs, 1967; Niskanen, 1971 ]. Governmental actors can be identified through a review of agency-enabling legislation and government organization manuals.
The appropriate geographical and other boundaries within which to identify interests in 'institutional assessments should be drawn from an understanding of the stakes rather than river basin boundaries, subject matter, or other artificially imposed limits. For instance, the analyst should not limit discussion to laws and institutions whose direction is exclusively water planning, development, and management. Other laws and institutions have noteworthy effects on water availability and use. National and regional forces which are creating new water development patterns ought to be identified. Take It is important to look at consequences from a particularized or localized perspective as well as basinwide. Despite the fact that physical scientists describe river basins as general, interconnected systems, the experience of impacts is often discrete and localized. For example, if localized but significant shortages are likely to occur in a basin that, overall, has a water surplus, the analyst should identify the threatened uses and users.
Finally, the analyst must recognize that changes in the issue context may well affect perceptions of interests and emergence of relevant actors. The definition of interest is a dynamic process, and impacts that spark little reaction now may be the basis of political action later. Thus it is important to portray the identification of interest as a process and signal what may be only latent constituencies [Truman, 1955; Cobb and Elder, 1972] ; for example, the pollution of groundwater stirs interest today where there was none a few years ago. Also, while the problem of land subsidence caused by falling water tables where extensive overdraft occurs has not prompted a concerned constituency, it one day may in areas of Arizona. Where the analyst can identify latent constituencies, it is useful to specify the barriers and incentives toward organization, such as conflicting interests, lack of information, and the costs of participation. Finally, it must be remembered that where the basis for conflict among water users or claimants exists, the water rights or claims of the parties often take on the character of chips in a poker game: they define, in part, the bargaining power, strategy, and staying power of participants in the bargaining process. Rights and claims often are modified or redefined in the bargaining process surrounding water development and management. Water rights and relations are one part rule and one part process. However static they appear for long periods, they are subject to change.
Identifying the Resources Actors
Economic power. Economic power has varied characteristics: market power, the power to create jobs, the power to influence legislatures and administrators, and the power to hire lawyers and engage in costly judicial proceedings. Such economic power may be found in both public and private sectors. Analysis of economic power should examine its varied manifestations and its potential for influencing decisions.
One attribute of economic power is ability to pay for water supply. The purchasing power among water users differs significantly, particularly in settings where publicly subsidized water uses (e.g., irrigated agriculture) are presented with competition from new industries (e.g., coal-fired power plants). For example, the price of water under the national reclamation program in the western United States has been based on a farmer's "ability to pay," resulting in low-priced water (e.g., $7.50/acre foot per annum) being used on low income yield crops. Some crops become unprofitable, for example, when water prices begin to exceed $15 or $20/acre foot per annum. The capacity of would-be users to pay higher than customary prices for water in an area where inadequate or no unappropriated water exists can result in water rights transfers from the economically disadvantaged to the economically advantaged. This phenomenon ought to be identified by the analyst. For instance, the Intermountain Power Project (IPP) agreed to purchase stock in mutual water companies from farmers near Lynndyl, Utah, at a high price of $1775/acre foot (for a permanent, not per annum, right to use) [Weatherford, 1982a] . While the influence of economics is often more difficult to document than the IPP case, federal and state lobbying laws that require groups who try to influence legislation to register and provide basic financial information have helped researchers. It is now possible to ascertain the size of lobbying staffs and the amount of money spent on that activity. Often it is more difficult to specify the economic resources of industrial interests whose influence is exercised in the course of doing business than it is private organizations whose main purpose is affecting governmental action. Prevailing values and public opinion. An important resource that supports certain uses and users is the general and specific attitudes held by the public about the desirability of alternative uses. The analyst should assess attitudes, both their distribution and intensity. These attitudes may not be closely related to--indeed, they may conflict with--the economists' calculation of value. For instance, public opinion survey data indicate that voters in the Southwest would prefer that the same or more water be supplied to irrigated agriculture in the future. They feel this way in spite of the fact that irrigated agriculture currently accounts for as much as 90% of diversions and that other uses, such as municipal and industrial, are small, high value, and growing . These people may feel that water should be used in agriculture because they prefer the environmental amenities associated with agriculture (open space, green expanses) over suburban home tracts or industrial park complexes. If so, then water in agriculture has an external value not captured in markets or entered into the economist's calculations but which should nevertheless be calculated by the institutional analyst.
There are a variety of methods through which the analyst can ascertain public opinion, some much more reliable than others. Most simply, the analyst can make a content analysis of local newspaper coverage and editorial opinion. Local histories, biographies, and other literature may also be rough indicators of public attitudes. It must be recognized, however, that local commentators, however familiar with local attitudes, may well have biases which color their expressions of view. In many cases, a survey may already have been done by administrative agencies, private groups, or university scholars employing questions that may be useful to the analyst. Care must be taken in employing such studies to insure that sampling procedures and interpretations are scientifically justifiable. In some cases the analyst may want to conduct a survey either of elites--those most closely involved in the subject of water resources--or the mass public. However, the framing of questions and the drawing of samples are complex matters about which the nonprofessional should seek professional advice [Hennessy, Political resources. The analyst may find these resources difficult and even perilous to specify. At the same time, some political resources may be extremely important in institutional analysis and the absence of such analysis may make an assessment relatively meaningless. Some measures may be fairly well agreed upon, i.e., size of membership in organizations, ability to turn out membership for political activities such as voting or letter writing, and ability to influence others through the press or with campaign contributions. Since the impact of political resources often comes from the reputation for power rather than its actual exercise, the analyst can often rely on indexes of reputation. Groups that newspapers, journals, decision-makers, and students of the subject matter say have political power often do in fact have power. In understanding institutional structure, the analyst should be aware that most decisions involving water resources are made on the basis of bargaining, negotiation, and compromise. But the character of the bargaining varies, depending on the arena in which the bargaining occurs. This is so because institutions have diverse decision rules, traditions, legal authority, and professional orientation. A wide variety of interests with varying intensities of concern are involved in legislative decision-making; consequently, the result may reflect a broad consensus but not necessarily be precisely suited to the major active interests whose stakes are significant and real. On the other hand, only the most active interests with important stakes are likely to bear the cost, both in time and money, involved in litigation. There is a major bargaining component in both the legislative and judicial arenas, but the interests represented, the focus of the issue, the evidentiary base, and the scope within which compromise may occur may be quite different in the two arenas.
Moreover, interests have differential access to given decision-making arenas, i.e., the opportunities for groups to approach decision makers to obtain a favorable hearing for their cause vary from one institutional setting to the next. Recent history has demonstrated that water development interests have had greater influence in legislatures than they have had in the courts, where environmental groups have tended to gain advantage. Moreover, interests have quite natural advantages in various forums; given the defensive posture of most environmental groups, it is not suprising that they have tended to rely on the judicial system to prevent administrative agencies--and sometimes even Congress--from achieving water development objectives. The selection of a forum or arena in which to undertake the contest for achieving its water-oriented goals may be one of the most important strategic choices an interest group or actor may make. A decision about appropriate decision structures is not, therefore, an exercise in logic or constitutional law, but rather an exercise in political analysis and evaluation of possible consequences [Wenner, 1976] .
Finally, like many issues dealt with by American government, decisions on water resources tend to be made incrementally, with partial decisions being made by various actors and institutional structures over an extended period of time. Most institutions and decision-making processes have only part of the "action," and thus final decisions resulting in dedication of a given water supply to a given purpose are often made only after numerous preliminary decisions have cleared away objections. Moreover, each of the preliminary decisions is likely to call forth opposing efforts in other arenas where conflicting interests have the advantage. Thus a water agency may allocate water to a project, be challenged in a court, whose decision, if contrary to the water allocation, may be appealed to the legislature. One-stop decision making, however attractive it may seem to those desiring quick action, has never been favored in the American political process. The analyst, therefore, must be prepared to evaluate not only the likely action of an agency directly charged with a decision on a specific issue, but the subsequent and contingent actions that are likely to be engaged by the initial decision. The following discussion is designed to sensitize the analyst to the principal institutional structures through which decisions are likely to be made. It also examines the key orientations of these structures and how they may play a part in the determination of societal values and the allocation of those values among conflicting groups.
Congress and state legislatures. Congress and state legislatures are key institutions in making certain kinds of modifications and adjustments in the institutional structure and in determining the substance of water policy. Congress must authorize water projects and finance water pollution control projects. State legislatures play a key role in defining water rights; Congress may or may not play a major role in the quantification of federal and Indian water rights. Both legislative bodies may determine the influence that various groups may play in water project decision making by designing processes for public participation.
Legislative bodies are among the most "open" of public institutions in this country. Despite their openness, access is not equally available to all groups and interests. The internal structures of legislative bodies and the nexus between legislators, constituent groups, executive officials, and public opinion tend to skew the legislative process in favor of certain values and against others. In terms of water policy, Congress historically has been strongly oriented toward federal sponsorship and financing of water developments as a species of public works having great voter appeal. Opposing interests and those who sought to guard the public treasury--such as the President--seldom had much influence over water policy making.
The incentive structure of legislative bodies has changed markedly in the past 15 years, in part because of fiscal conservatism and in part because public values associated with protecting the environment have come to play a more important part in legislators' thinking and behavior. Analysts should be aware of the attitude structure and the historical record of legislative bodies in their assessments of the role that those bodies may play in the determination of policy or institutional change . Both because of the broad distribution of agricultural groups concerned with water policy and the strong support agricultural values generally receive in the United States, legislative bodies tend to respond to organized agricultural interests on matters concerning water policy. Where those groups are powerfully organized, they can have a significant effect on legislative output. The various agricultural organizations plus the association of irrigation and water supply districts in California have been extremely influential in many recent issues; for example, the peripheral canal, opposition to changes recommended by a governor's commission on water law revision, and opposition to any controls imposed on groundwater pumping without a firm state commitment to augment current surface water supplies. Finally, it should be understood that a judicial strategy may be part of a more general strategy that involves long delays and possible remedial action by legislatures or even voters. Dominant interests may argue that litigation that lasts 10 years--even if their position is not likely to be sustained--allows them to continue to enjoy rights to water or allows them to continue to pollute until enjoined from doing so. Moreover, they have some confidence that they may appeal to a legislature or to Congress for some remedial action, either in the form of a delay in the application of the decision or some financial assistance to mitigate the burden placed upon them.
Federal and state administrative agencies. Administrative agencies are both technical designers of projects and programs and advocates of those projects and programs in the political process. They are often mission-oriented agencies, authorized to pursue the achievement of certain goals such as reclamation of land, protection of fish and wildlife, and protection of the environment generally, or energy development. Because both external and internal incentive structures are geared to achieving agency missions, it is hardly surprising that the agencies' vision of the public interest is partial. Moreover, agencies work effectively with interest groups and with individual members and committees of Congress and state legislatures in carrying out their tasks. At the federal level, the tripartite relationships among agencies, congressional committees, and interest groups are sometimes referred to as "iron triangles."
When several agencies have partial responsibilities for activities affecting water management, it is often necessary for them to coordinate plans, negotiate differences, exchange technical information, and generally cooperate in the achievement of concerted policy and administration. When they cannot do so, other agencies of government--chief executives, legislatures--mediate their disputes. The resolution of the snail darter controversy by an act of Congress is an illustration of this process. Some administrative agencies are clearly in a superior position to realize their goals. This superiority lies in greater access to political power in legislative bodies and greater support in local communities. For years the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has occupied a secondary position to water development agencies in the planning and development of water projects. It may be argued that the Service has now achieved greater influence in these matters owing to the strength of the environmental movement both nationally and in specific localities where the implications of these bureaucratic decisions are felt most directly. The analyst should be sensitive to these shifts in political and administrative standing.
Fragmentation of administrative responsibilities and authority is inevitable in dealing with
Local governments: Municipalities, counties, and districts. Urban water supply is a major problem throughout the United States, with recurring severe shortages during periods of drought. Policies of local governments are therefore important factors in evaluating the institutional characteristics of a given water supply situation. This is specifically recognized in the upper Colorado River basin assessment, where note is taken of the positive benefits of conservation efforts in Albuquerque, Salt Lake City, and Denver in reducing the competition for scarce Colorado River water [Colorado Department of Natural Resources, 1979]. Similarly, it is generally recognized that the rehabilitation of leaking and inefficient water systems in the eastern states would greatly reduce water supply shortages in many river basins.
Municipal governments are largely retailers of water, although some municipalities have thoroughly integrated water supply systems. Their retailer capacity is reflected in decisions such as whether to meter water use, the extent to which water charges are hidden in the tax base, and the pricing policies adopted (flat rate, higher rates for greater use, marginal pricing, etc.). Demand for water is clearly elastic, i.e., demand is directly related to price and thus is susceptible to deliberate manipulation by those who supply water for residential, commercial and industrial use.
Municipal water use ordinarily takes legal precedence over other uses, particularly in the western states. Moreover, municipalities have the power of eminent domain and are in a position to obtain water supplies by payment of fair compensation. With greater fiscal capacity and greater willingness to pay high prices, municipalities are in a better position to obtain water supplies in times of dire necessity. The drought of the late 1970's demonstrated the responsiveness of major wholesalers of water, such as the Bureau of Reclamation, to transfer large blocks of water away from agriculture and toward urban uses.
Urban interests, sometimes reflected in the positions taken by municipal leaders, often correspond with the interests of environmental groups. Many environmentalists live in urban areas but enjoy the natural environment, which they wish to protect against development. When supply is scarce, supporting priorities for municipal use may preclude resource development in wildland areas. On the other hand, other environmentalists may oppose urban growth with its accompanying increase in municipal water use.
The interests of smaller urban communities in largely agricultural areas may correspond with local agriculturalists. These communities may favor water development for agriculture or retention of water in agriculture rather than allowing water to be transferred to other interests, such as energy companies. They may use their influence in legislatures or act directly through their zoning powers to impede changes that threaten the agricultural base.
There are a large variety of irrigation, water supply, drainage, water conservation districts, and water companies authorized under state statutes to supply water for many purposes but largely for agricultural uses. In some, influence is broadly distributed, but in others, particularly those in which voting rights are based on the extent of property ownership, influence is highly concentrated. Such districts are jealous of their local prerogatives and resist the imposition of requirements by state legislatures or Congress [Maass and Anderson, 1978] . Opposition to the acreage limitation requirements of the Reclamation Act and resistance to groundwater control legislation are in part traceable to this strong local feeling.
Districts exist for the purpose of supplying water and are largely service organizations for their members. Under some circumstances they may have some independent influence, particularly where the price of water is high, the technology of supply and management is sophisticated, and the conse- 
The Operation of Market Mechanisms
A major method of accommodating new water uses is through the transfer of water rights from existing uses. While markets for water rights are only beginning to appear in the United States, the reallocation of water by water sales and exchanges is on the rise and can be expected to play a more important role in water management in the future. The creation of these new markets is dependent upon state legislative action to remove legal prohibitions against transfers, upon state legislative action to further define property rights in water so that they can be dissociated from place or purpose, and upon the authorization, probably by state legislature, of institutional structures to provide mechanisms for such transfers that protect the interests of third parties. Recent research has produced both criteria for identifying and evaluating water rights markets in the west, as well as case examples of proficient and nonexistent markets [Khoshakhlagh et al., 1977; Ellis and DuMars, 1978] .
Market arrangements are designed to make it possible for willing sellers and buyers to exchange water at a price that reflects that commodity's scarcity value. Institutional arrangements such as these suggest that society's interest is enhanced by the heightened efficiency in use associated with having water priced at its real value. It may be expected that the creation of markets will be favored by industrial, commercial, and municipal interests, all of which have a stake in obtaining increased supplies from agriculture and who have the capital to make purchases. Opponents are likely to be found among agriculturists and those closely linked to the agricultural industry who fear that market arrangements will result in a marked decline in agriculture and associated commercial, financial, and industrial activities. They may also be concerned that third party interests may not be adequately protected. Studies in the Tulare Basin in California, for example, revealed little support for state legislative action to remove the prohibition against transfers of water beyond the boundary lines of individual irrigation or water supply districts [Weatherford, 1982b] .
While clearly not market pricing, it should be noted that both state and federal agencies, to the extent that they are engaged in water supply organizations, are moving in the direction of full-cost pricing of water. It may be expected, for example, that prices charged by the Bureau of Reclamation to reclamation customers will dramatically increase when water delivery contracts are renewed in the future.
Water pricing can be expected to facilitate entry into the market by new users--at least in the short term--and to lead to greater efficiency in use. The relative role of water markets (present and prospective) in the reallocation and conservation of water supplied ought to be then noted and, if possible, analyzed in assessments [Angelides and Bardach, 1978] . The analysis could include an examination of the legal and institutional barriers to the development and operation of water markets (such as belief in and long reliance on "free" water, legal restrictions on the sale or leasing of water, or long-term repayment contracts), as well as some of the negative variants or effects (e.g., monopolization, lack of participation by affected persons). 
Changes in Legal Definitions
Negotiated Settlements and Coalitions
Where interests conflict, resolution can often be found in a negotiated settlement. A would-be user of water can sometimes still the fears of existing water users who perceive the new use will impinge on their rights by agreeing in advance to compensate them for injury or to take specific actions to mitigate the adverse effects. Indemnification and mitigation are techniques which have allowed oil shale companies to acquire conditional water rights on the west slope of Colorado, for example, although on the face of the record of water fights filings in the area an analyst might have concluded that no water would have been available without a formal water rights transfer [University of Wisconsin, 1975] .
Negotiation can also be prompted because institutions fear the high costs of uncertainty and protracted conflict. For instance, conflict and uncertainty over the long-term flow of the Colorado River has structured development decisions. As a hedge against uncertainty, the state of California insisted upon a guarantee of 4.4 x 106 acre feet per year after the Central Arizona Project was built. Consequently, the burden of risk of low river flows was shifted from California to Arizona in the Colorado River Basin Bill of 1968 [Ingram, 1969] . Attempts to minimize and shift the burden of risk during negotiation are characteristic of water resource politics and can be anticipated in the assessment process.
Newly Developed or Disseminated Information
The lack of knowledge and information can give rise to conflict or prevent needed change from occurring. One group may oppose a proposed water development or management decision because its likely effects are unknown or a matter of dispute. Lack of knowledge can also spawn new institutions. Political disputes over water supply requirements and questions about the feasibility of transferring water from the Columbia to the Colorado river basin thus, for example, led to the creation of the National Water Commission and its assignment to study interbasin and interstate transfer issues and possible policy ideas. More knowledge and information can sometimes have the effect of suggesting solutions to conflict or removing the grounds for conflict. The availability and effectiveness of institutions which generate, analyze, and disseminate information concerning important water issues are therefore appropriate subjects for the analyst to address.
Engineering and Technical Solutions
Sometimes the response to an institutional problem is largely technical. The relations between the United States and Mexico have been strained over the incidence of high salinity in the waters of the Colorado flowing south of the border. The express terms of the 1944 Mexican Water Treaty allotting 1.5 x 106 acre feet of the Colorado River flow per annum to Mexico were silent on the water quality issue. Subsequent agreements in 1965 and 1972 involving physical solutions were required to address the salinity problem. Among the hoped-for technical solutions are bypass canals, groundwater pumping, desalinization, and the control of salty point sources [Mann, 1975] . When technical approaches are taken to institutional problems, however, the costs can be high both economically and institutionally. Neither agriculture nor industrial users, for example, can afford the costs of desalted water. The institutional analyst needs to remain vigilant to the possible implications of attempts to redefine and address problems in technical terms.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Our goal has been to convince water resources scholars, students, and analysts that institutional analyses are (1) important and (2) feasible. They are important because institutions are important, often as important as physical conditions that constrain or make possible a given project or program. Institutional analyses are feasible--they are done all the time--but they require an understanding of the tools and the data resources that are available. Institutions are not necessarily "black boxes," inscrutable and mysterious, even though they may not be described with mathematical precision. They deal with choices and preferences and therefore partake of a normative element that is not altogether predictable. But the elements that influence those choices--ideology, decision-making rules, laws, regulations, traditions, and rights--can be described, evaluated, and assessed.
We hope also to have convinced our readers that institutional assessments should examine not only the statics but the dynamics of institutional arrangements. Institutions exist for making decisions, and those decisions imply changes, challenges, and new sets of circumstances and require judgment, interpretation of the past, assessment of the present, and predictions of the future. In other words, institutions tend to deal with dynamics and are themselves subject to the dynamics of the subject matter with which they deal. Institutions can and do change to meet challenges just as physical or economic arrangements can and do change.
We have argued that institutions are made up of human beings who are subject to various incentives. Some institutional assessments often favor creation of formal organizations without careful examination of the incentives to which the officers of the organization may be subjected. The result is formalism but little capacity to deal realistically with situations that invite imaginative change. The assessment that makes a contribution will be one that examines how human beings are likely to behave and not how we might hope they would behave. Because institutions are dynamic and made up of people who make choices, the sophisticated analyst must be aware of the possibility of unintended consequences. Predictably, those who are averse to change will react, set backfires, stir up opposition. Conflict may occur in policy sectors other than that with which our analyst is dealing. The analyst is therefore careful to assess not only water policy but also the context in which water policy is fashioned and implemented.
Finally, the realistic water resource scholar and practitioner will understand that institutional analysis, because it deals with complexities and dynamics, is time-consuming, intellectually challenging, and costly. It cannot be done "on the cheap"; it cannot be done with inadequate tools; and it cannot be purchased in a "canned" form from work done elsewhere.
